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In the course of his opinion in the case of Bohn Mfg. Co.
v. Hollis,' decided in 1893, Justice Mitchell, bf the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, observed:
"This is the age of associations and unions in all departments of labor and business for purposes of mutual benefit
and protection. Confined to proper limits, both as to ends
and means, they are not only lawful but laudable. Carried
beyond these limits they are liable to become dangerous agencies for wrong and oppression. Beyond what limits these
associations cannot go without interfering with the legal
rights of others is the problem which, in various phases, the
courts will doubtless be frequently called to pass upon."
Two cases decided during the current year, namely,
Weston v. Barnicoat2, in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and McIntyre v. Weinert, in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, furnishes illustrations of a lately developed
scheme of combination among traders, which, in one phase,
'55 N. W. Rep. m1g.
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gives rise to the legal problem mentioned by the learned
judge in the language just quoted, and these cases may serve
as a text for a brief discussion of the subject of this article.
In each case the plaintiff based his action on the ground
that the defendant had resorted to unlawful methods for the
collection of a debt alleged by the defendant to be due him
from the plaintiff; the methods being the "black-list" and
"boycott" (using the terms in their popular sense), made
effective through the agency of an organization of which the
defendant was a member. The scheme of the organization
was to bring about a combination of all wholesale dealers in
a particular branch of trade in a given locality so that retail
dealers, of which plaintiff was one, in the same branch, and
carrying on business in the same place, would be dependent
for their supplies upon members of the combination. When
a retail dealer was reported by any member of the organization as having refused after a certain time to pay a debt alleged to be due the latter, his name was entered upon a list
known as the "black-list," which was sent to all members of
the combination, who, after receiving it, were obliged under
the rules of the association to thereafter refuse to sell supplies to the alleged delinquent, either on credit or for cash,
until notified that his indebtedness had been discharged.
The effectiveness of this boycott system of collecting
debts, where the combination is strong enough to establish a
monopoly in a particular branch of trade, is perfectly apparent, and it is not surprising that the plan has been widely
adopted by wholesale dealers in the various commodities,
which are the subjects. of modem commerce. The tendency
of the times is towards the concentration of each branch of
trade in a few hands, and the monopoly, which is necessary
to the success of the plan, is thus the more easily established.
To what extent, if at all, the plan itself should receive the
approval of the courts is therefore a question of present importance, and if the decisions cited give any aid in its solution, they are worthy of careful study.
The facts of the Massachusetts case of Westoit v. Barnicoat are well stated in the report of the case as follows:
"This is an action of tort brought against a member of
an association of the type considered in Hartnettv. Associa-
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tion (169 Mass. 229) for using the machinery provided by
the Association's by-laws. The defendant made a claim
against the plaintiff for the price of a granite monument,
which the plaintiff declined to pay. The defendant thereupon notified the plaintiff that if the plaintiff did not pay he
should report the plaintiff's name to the Association, to be
placed upon its records of those who did not pay their honest
debts. The plaintiff not paying, the defendant notified the
local secretary, and thereupon the plaintiff received a letter
from the Association, urging him to settle or explain, with
the threat of placing his name upon the record if he did not.
The consequence of placing a name upon the record or blacklist was a boycott by the Association, as the plaintiff was notified by a copy of the following by-law: 'No member of this
Association shall quote prices or do any work, either directly
or indirectly, for any person or persons whose name appears
on the list.' The plaintiff did not pay, and a little later his
name was placed upon the list with the anticipated result,
and with the effect of serious damage at least to the plaintiff's business. The plaintiff thereupon brought this action
for causing the circulation of the report and had a verdict."
The case was treated as an action of libel, the defamatory
publications being the notice, that plaintiff rdfused to pay a
debt due defendant, sent by the defendant to the Association,
and the "black-list" containing the name of plaintiff among
the names of those persons "who did not pay their honest
debts."
The defendant set up as a defence the truth of the alleged
libel and also that the communications complained of were
under the circumstances privileged. The exact issues of fact.
which were determined by the jury, did not appear from the
record, and the Court of Appeal therefore discussed the several grounds on which the verdict could be justified. The
truth of the alleged libel having been set up, it became a controverted question at the trial whether or not the plaintiff
was actually indebted to defendant, but the Appellate Court,
in sustaining the verdict, did not rest its conclusion on the
assumption that this question of indebtedness had been determined by the jury in favor of the plaintiff. On the contrary,
the court in its opinion said:
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"Even if there was a debt, however, the plaintiff might
have recovered upon one of several grounds, that the publication imported a general habit on the part of the plaintiff of
not paying his debts (whether it had that meaning was one
question to be left to the jury) or that although there was a
debt there was a counter-claim in recoupment, which manifestly justified the plaintiff in not paying until it was adjusted, or that the publication was caused with malicious intention."
It should be noted that while defendant had only one
claim against plaintiff, as appeared from the evidence, his
name at the instance of defendant had been placed on a
record of those "who did not pay their honest debts." The
court might therefore have held, if it concluded that the
plaintiff must recover, if at all, on the ground of libel, that
if the alleged-libelous notice had been confined to an exact
statement of plaintiff's indebtedness, which the jury believed
to be true, theverdict should have been in favor of the defendant, the communication being in the judgment of the court
not privileged. On the question of privilege the court said:
"Several rulings were asked on the question, of privilege.
As we have seen, the case is to be considered solely on the
footing of libel. From this point of view it is perfectly apparent that the judge could not have ruled that the communication was privileged as matter of law. The jury might
well have found facts that would cut at the roots of such
a ruling. They might have found not only that the proposition, that the plaintiff was a man who refused or neglected
to pay his honest debts, was false, as they have found, but
also that it was known by the defendant to be false. They
might have found that it was volunteered from malevolent
motives. They might have found that the whole organization was a mere scheme to oust the courts of their jurisdiction and to enforce colorable claims of the members by a boycott intended to take the place of legal process, and that there
was no pretense of any duty about the matter. Indeed. it is
hard to see how the by-laws, or any understanding of the defendant about the by-laws, could have afforded him a justification, as the by-laws merely expressed the terms on
which he saw fit to enter into a voluntary organization. A
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man cannot justify a libel by proving that he contracted to
libel. More specifically, a false statement of a kind manifestly hurtful to a man in his credit and business and intended to be so, is not privileged because made in obedience
to the requirements of a voluntary association got up for
the purpose of compelling by a boycott the satisfaction of its
members' claims by the exclusion of a resort to the courts."
"We do not assume that the character of this organization
was what we have described. We only say that the jury
might have found it to be such, and the requests for rulings
do not exclude that possible view of the facts. Of course,
we do not mean to say that the statement might not have
been privileged, if believed to be true, and if the purpose of
the Association and publication was, and was understood to
be merely to give information to all parties concerning the
credit of people with whom they might deal, but none of the
requests were limited to such a state of facts. The difficulty
in supposing it is that the by-laws expressly require the members to have no dealings with any person whose name is on
the list."
A point was made by the defendant that as the publication
of the "black-list" was made by the Association he was not
responsible for its action; but the court refused to sustain
this view and held, on the contrary, that the defendant having, by his notice of indebtedness sent to the Association, pursuant to an understood plan, set in motion its machinery of
boycott and black-list as against the plaintiff, was responsible
for the consequences to the latter.
The case may therefore be regarded as authority for the
propositions:
First. The publication by means of a "black-list," such as
described above, of the name of a trader as a delinquent
debtor, is libelous per se and actionable without proof of
special damage if the allegation of indebtedness be false in
fact.
Second. Such publication does not become privileged
by reason of the fact that it is made in accordance with the
rules of an association designed for the purpose of enforcing
the payment of debts due members through boycotting or
refusing supplies to their alleged delinquent debtors.
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Third. The individual member of an association organized for the collection of debts, in the manner described, is
responsible in damages to any trader, whose name, by a false
statement that the latter is indebted to him, he causes to be
placed on the "black-list" of the association.
Having regard to the first two propositions as stated, the
case may, on hasty consideration, appear to have departed
from earlier authorities on the law of libel; since it has generally been held that to falsely allege of a trader that he is
indebted, without imputing insolvency, is not libelous per se,
and that one trader may directly, or through an association
of which both are members, impart information concerning
the credit of a third, without incurring liability by reason
of the falsity of such information, if it were given in good
faith, with an honest belief in its truth, and for the purpose
of enabling the person receiving it to determine whether or
not credit could be safely extended to the third party. It is
submitted, however, that the decision, instead of advancing
new theories on the law of libel, is in thorough accord with
principles already well established. The court undoubtedly
treated the "black-list" libelous per se, not simply because
it contained a false allegation of indebtedness, but, for the
further reason, that the extrinsic circumstances surrounding
the publication necessarily tended to make it injurious to
the trade or calling of the person named as the delinquent
debtor.
It has always been held actionable without proof of special
damage to falsely impute insolvency to a trader, because the
ability to obtain credit and carry on trade is thereby presumptively impaired; and when the same effect is necessarily produced by the publication in a particular way of a false allegation, that a trader owes a debt, it is only logical that the
law should attach the same consequence to such a publication, as if the fact of insolvency were falsely alleged. It is
indeed difficult to conceive a plan better calculated to inflict
injury and damage on a trader than to circulate among
dealers, upon whom he is dependent for supplies, a statement, the effect of which is to prevent their selling to him
upon any terms; and if such statement is false it should, upon
well-established principles, be regarded as an actionable libel
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It is not unfair to the

person giving the false information to presume that the
damage intended by him and his association was in fact suffered.
The second proposition stated above upon the authority
of the case under discussion is equally sound, and in harmony with the principles, to which the courts have always
relied, in determining whether or not a communication,
otherwise libelous, was justifiable and excusable on the plea
of privilege.
Odgers on "Libel and Slander," page 238, states the rule
to be that where the defendant has an interest in the subject
matter of the communication, and the person to whom the
communication is made has a corresponding interest, in such
case every communication honestly made in order to protect
such common interest is privileged by reason of the occasion.
He further says: "Such common interest is generally a
pecuniary one; as that of two customers of the same bank,
two directors of the same company, two creditors of the
same debtor." And again: "To be within the privilege the
statement must be such as the occasion warrants, and must
be made bona fide to protect the private interests both of the
speaker and the person addressed."
Chief Justice Holmes, of the Massachusetts court, recognized these principles when, in the opinion already quoted, he
said:
"Of course we do not mean to say the statement might
not have been privileged, if believed to be true, and if the
purpose of the Association and publication was, and was understood to be merely to give information to members concerning the credit of people with whom they might deal."
In such a case the legitimate object of the communication
being to protect the interest of the person or persons to
whom addressed, would bring it within the exception to the
general rule, and make it privileged. As pointed out by
the court, however, protection to the members of the Association, to whom the black-list notice was sent, was not the
object sought to be accomplished thereby, for the reason
that, after receiving it, not only were they bound to refuse
credit to the alleged debtor, but according to the rules of the
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Association must decline to trade with him on any terms.
The object of the communication was to enforce, by the coercive process of boycott, the collection of a debt due one
member of the Association, and was therefore in his interest
alone, and not made in a common interest, which would give
it a privileged character. It is no answer to say that a common interest arose by reason of membership in an association, whose by-laws required the notice to be sent, for to
quote again from the language of the court: "A man cannot
justify libel by proving that he contracted to libel."
The Pennsylvania case of McIntyre v. Weinert (supra)
also sustains the proposition that a false notice of indebtedness sent by one member to other members of an association, in accordance with its by-laws, for the purpose of causing them to boycott or refuse supplies to the alleged debtor
until he pays the claim, is libelous without proof of special
damage; but the court in that case was not under the pleadings called upon to decide whether such a notice could be
regarded as a privileged communication, by reason of the
fact that it was confined to members of an association organized for mutual benefits and protection. The issue was raised
by a demurrer to the declaration or plaintiff's statement of
claim, which alleged not only that the allegation of indebtedness was false but maliciously made, and the court held that
the facts of the statement, being admitted by the demurrer,
the plea of privilege could not be raised, since the malice in
making the communication complained of would destroy
any privileged character which it might otherwise have possessed. The facts of this case, which may be of interest, are
briefly as follows:
The plaintiff brought suit for injury to his business, that
of a retail produce dealer, by the act of defendant, a wholesale produce dealer, in falsely notifying the members of an
association of wholesale produce dealers known as the "Philadelphia Produce Credit and Collection *Bureau," that
plaintiff was indebted to him in a certain sum, which plaintiff
had refused to pay. In consequence of this notice plaintiff's
name was placed on a debtor's list or "black-list" of the Association, and all its members thereafter, in accordance with
its rules, as defendant intended they should, refused to sup-
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ply plaintiff with supplies either on credit or for cash. It
was alleged in the statement of claim that the Association
was composed of all of the most prominent wholesale dealers
in Philadelphia, and that plaintiff was almost entirely dependent upon them for his supplies.
It will be noted in this case that the communication complained of simply alleged that the plaintiff was indebted to
defendant in a certain sum, differing in this respect from the
Massachusetts case, wherein the "black-list" notice was to
the effect that the plaintiff in the latter case did not "pay his
honest debts."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, held the
false notice of indebtedness, considered in connection with
the extrinsic circumstances alleged in the statement, libelous
per se and actionable without proof of special damage. The
court, through Justice Mestrezat, said:
"In support of his demurrer, it is claimed by the defendant
that the writing is not libelous. Standing alone, possibly
that may be true. But in considering this writing we must
consider not only the writing itself, but the inducement laid
in the statement. 'It is the office of the inducement to narrate the extrinsic circumstances, which, coupled with the
language published, affects its construction, and renders it
actionable; where standing alone and not thus explained,
the language would appear not to affect him injuriously.'
(Townsend on 'Slander and Libel,' Sec. 308.) The publication complained of, considered in the light of the extrinsic matters averred in the statement, clearly tends to injure the plaintiff in his business as a retail produce dealer,
and is therefore actionable."
If in addition to being libelous per se, the "black-list"
notice cannot be regarded as a privileged communication,
as held by the Massachusetts court, then it is clear that the
members of a debt-collecting association, based upon the
plan already described, must assume full responsibility for
the truth of any allegation of indebtedness, circulated in this
manner among them in accordance with its rules; and even
though the allegation be made in good faith, and with an
honest belief in its truth, and yet should be judiciously determined false in fact in an action brought against them, or
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any of them, by the alleged debtor, the latter would be entitled to a verdict. The importance of this proposition is
plain when it is considered that actions for black-listing alleged debtors will most frequently arise in cases where there
exists some dispute over the claim alleged to be due and the
debtor regards himself in a position to deny the indebtedness.
As we have seen, the court did not in either of the two
cases discussed consider whether, eliminating the element
of libel, the action could be sustained on other grounds. In
these debt-collecting associations the "black-list" is simply
the method employed to institute the boycott, which is the
principal and direct source of injury to the delinquent debtor,
and the question therefore arises, Can he secure redress for
this injury even though the debt, to enforce the collection of
which it is inflicted, is actually due as alleged in the blacklist notice?
This question may be considered in a twofold aspect; first,
whether the person injured by the boycott has a right of action against the member for whose benefit and at whose instance it is instituted, and, secondly, whether the Association,
through which the boycott is enforced, incurs liability for the
damage inflicted.
When a creditor institutes a boycott against his debtor
through means of an association, such as above described, for
the purpose of enforcing payment of the debt, he simply
puts into operation a pre-existing agreement between himself
and the other members of the association, that they will not
deal with any person indebted to one of them until the debt
is paid. If therefore this agreement in its operation constitutes an invasion of any legal rights of the debtor, the creditor is employing unlawful methods to collect debts due him,
and, if loss is inflicted thereby, he becomes responsible. If,
on the other hand, the agreement is in all respects legitimate,
the damage resulting from acts done in pursuance of it is
not the subject of an action, and would fall under the designation damnum absque injuria.
It must be admitted that one person may refuse to sell to
another on any pretext whatever, and cannot be held to account for his conduct. Is it equally within his right to per-
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suade or induce another to exercise the same privilege and
refuse to trade with a third person for the purpose of injuring the latter?
The authorities bearing on this question are by no means
harmonious. In England the earlier cases sustain the proposition that an act, otherwise lawful, might become unlawful
by reason of the motive with which it was done. Thus in
Keeble v. Hickeringill, cited and followed in Carrington v.
Taylor,4 it was held actionable for the plaintiff to fire off his
gun on his own premises, with the malicious intent of frightening wild ducks from a decoy owned by his neighbor.
The same principle was recognized in the case of Flood v.
Jackson (1895) 5 and Bowen v. Hall," but the more recent
case of Allen v. Flood7 reversed Flood v. Jackson, and may
be regarded as departing from the earlier doctrine as stated
in Bowen v. Hall. The syllabus in the case of Allen v. Flood
reads as follows:
"An act lawful in itself is not converted by a malicious
or bad motive into an unlawful act so as to make the doer of
the act liable to a civil action.
"Discussion of the cases in which evil motive is said to be
an essential ingredient in a civil cause of acti6n, such as malicious persecution. See per Lord Watson, Lord Herschell,
and Lord Davey, at pages 92, 93, 125, 126, 173.

"The respondents were shipwrights employed 'for the job'
on the repairs to the woodwork of a ship, but were liable to
be discharged at any time. Some ironworkers who were
employed on the- ironwork of the ship objected to the respondents being employed, on the ground that the respondents had previously worked at ironwork on a ship for another firm, the practice of shipwrights working on iron being
resisted by the trade union of which the ironworkers were
members. The appellant, who was a delegate of the union,
was sent for by the ironworkers and informed that they intended to leave off working. The appellant informed the
employers that unless the respondents were discharged all
II East, 573.

5L. R. (0895),2 Q. B. 21.
1L. R., 6 Q. B. D. 333.
'L. R., Appeal Cases (i898),

I.
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the ironworkers would be called out or 'knock off' work
(it was doubtful which expression was used); that the employers had no option; that the iron men were doing their
best to put an end to the practice of shipwrights doing ironwork, and that wherever the respondents were employed the
iron men would cease work. There was evidence that this
was done to punish the respondents for what they had done
in the past. The employers, in fear of this threat being carried out, which (as they knew) would have stopped their
business, discharged the respondents and refused to employ
them again. In the ordinary course the respondents' employment would have continued. The respondents having
brought an action against the appellant, the jury found that
he had maliciously induced the employers to discharge the
respondents and not to engage them, and gave the respondents a verdict for damages.
"Held, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal
(1895), 2 Q. B. 21 (Lord Halsbury, L. C., and Lords Ashbourne and Morris dissenting), that the appellant had violated no legal right of the respondents, done no unlawful
act, and used no unlawful means in procuring the respondents' dismissal; that his conduct was therefore not actionable, however malicious or bad his motive might be, and
that, notwithstanding the verdict, the appellant was entitled
to judgment.
"Carringtonv. Taylor (I8O9), ii East. 571, overruled,
and Keeble vs. Hickeringill (i7o6), II East. 574 n.; Lumley
v. Gye (i853), 2 E. & B. 216; Bowen v. Hall (i88i), 6 Q.
B. D. 333; and Tentperton v. Russell (1893), I Q. B. 715,
commented on."
Lord Morris, in dissenting from the judgment pronounced in the case, said that in his view it overturned "the
overwhelming judicial opinion of England."
The majority of the judges in their several opinions drew
a distinction between the procurement of the breach of an
enforceable contract, and the mere persuasion of another
not to enter into a contract with a third person, holding, to
use the language of Lord Herschell, "that in one case the
act procured was the violation of a legal right, for which
the person doing the act, which injured the plaintiff, could
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be sued as well as the person who procured it, whilst, in the
other case, no legal right was violated by the person who
did the act from which the plaintiff suffered."
Lord Chancellor Halsbury, in an able dissenting opinion,
vigorously combated this view, and argued that the legal
right of a man to be allowed free to contract for his labor was
recognized and protected by the law. To quote from his
opinion:
"The first objection made to the plaintiffs' right to recover
for the loss which they thus undoubtedly suffered is that no
right of the plaintiffs was infringed, and that the right contended for on their behalf is not a right recognized by
law, or at all events, only such a right as everyone else is entitled to deprive them of, if they stop short of physical violence
or obstruction. I think the right to employ their labor as they
will is a right both recognized by the law and sufficiently
guarded by its provisions to make any undue interference
with that right an actionable wrong.
"Very early authorities in the law have recognized the
right; and, in my view, no authority can be found which
questions or qualifies it. The schoolmaster who complained
that his scholars were being assaulted and brought an action,
the quarry owner who complained that his servants were
being menaced and molested, were both held to have a right
of action. And it appears to me that the importance of those
cases, and the principle established by them, have not been
sufficiently considered. It is said that threats of violence or
actual violence were unlawful means; the lawfulness of the
means I will discuss hereafter. But the point on which these
cases are important is the existence of the right. It was not
the schoolmaster who was assaulted; it was not the quarry
owner who was assaulted or threatened; but, nevertheless,
the schoolmaster was held entitled to bring an action in respect of the loss of scholars attending his school, and the
quarry owner in respect of the loss of workmen to his quarry.
They were third persons; no violence or threats were applied
to them, and the cause of action, which they had a right to
insist on, was the indirect effect upon themselves of violence
and threats applied to others.
"My Lords, in my view these are binding authorities to
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show that the preliminary question, namely, whether there
was any right of the plaintiffs to pursue their calling unmolested, must be answered in the affirmative. The question of
what is the right invaded would seem to be reasonably
answered, and the universality of the right to all Her
Majesty's subjects seems to me to be no argument against
its existence. It is, indeed, part of that freedom from restraint, that liberty of action, which, in my view, may be
found running through the principles of our law."
Having thus determined that the plaintiffs had certain
rights not arising from contract, in which the law would
protect them, Lord Halsbury relied upon the earlier decisions
already quoted for holding that if these rights were infringed by defendant, by acts malicious in law, the plaintiffs
were entitled to recover. He cited with approval the rule
laid down by Lord Justice Bowen in Mogul Steamship Company v. McGregor,8 in deciding whether, when intent to harm and actual harm has been proved, malice is
present, in the following language:
"In cases like this, when the element of intimidation, molestation or the other kinds of illegality to which I have alluded are not present, the question must be decided by the
application of the test I have indicated. Assume that what
is done is intentional, and that it is calculated to do harm to
others, then comes the question 'was it done with or without
just cause or excuse.' If it was bona fide in the use of a
man's own property, in the exercise of a man's own trade,
such legal justification would, I think, exist not the less
because what was done might seem to others to be selfish and
unreasonable. But such legal justification could not exist
where the act was done merely with the intention of causing
temporal harm without reference to one's own lawful gain
or the lawful enjoyment of one's own rights."
I have referred at some length to the dissenting opinion of
Lord Halsbury because it appears to be more nearly in accord with the decisions in this country than the judgment of
the court. Indeed Lord Halsbury himself observed that the
case of Keeble v. Hickeringill (supra), which was in effect

*LR., 21

Q. B. D. 544.
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overruled by the judgment in Allci v. Flood, had been generally recognized and acted upon in the American courts, and
cited as instances the cases of Walker v. Cronin9 and Angle
v. Chicago, Etc., Ry. Co.10 In these cases the principle was
recognized that malice in the procurement of an act could
be the basis of an action of tort, although the act in itself
could not be regarded as actionable.
Justice Brewer, of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of Angle v. St. Paul Ry. (supra), cited
with approval the case of Rice v. Manley,1 wherein the
plaintiff had made an agreement with one Stebbins to purchase from him a quantity of cheese, to be delivered at a
future day. The contract was not binding by reason of the
statute of frauds. The defendant knowing of this, by means
of a fictitious telegram, persuaded Stebbins that the plaintiff
did not want the cheese and would not take it, and thus
himself secured a purchase of it. The plaintiff having
brought his action for his failure due to the connivance of
the defendant to obtain the cheese from Stebbins, the defendant set up the plea that he had not procured the breach
of any contract which could be enforced against Stebbins
for the sale and delivery of the cheese; but the court overruled the objection, saying: "Plaintiff's actual damage is
certainly as great as it would have been if Stebbins had been
obliged to perform his contract of sale, and greater for the
reason that they cannot indemnify themselves for their loss
by a suit against Stebbins to recover damages for a breach of
contract."
Among other cases in this country wherein the principle
of the earlier English decisions was followed are Lucke v.
Clothing Cutters' Assembly, K. of L., 12 wherein it was
held actionable to procure the discharge of "non-union" employes by threatening to require "union" employes to quit
work; Jackson v. Stanfield,13 wherein the plaintiff was made
the victim of a boycott by retail lumber dealers, and the case
zo7 Mass. 555.

5isU. S. i (893).

66 N. Y. 82.
2277

Md. 396 (1893).

2236

N. E. 345 (Ind.).
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1
,of Moore & Co. v. Bricklayers' Union Trade et al.U
In
the last-mentioned case the subject was discussed at considerable length by Judge Taft, of the Ohio court. The
action was based on a boycott circular issued against the
plaintiff with the object of inducing bricklayers not to work
on buildings for which plaintiff furnished any materials. It
was held that this boycott was unlawful as being in the sense
of the law malicious, and apart from the element of conspiracy, would constitute a ground of action. Judge Taft,
after discussing the authorities, cited Bowen v.Hall (supra),
saying:
"It follows from this case that generally where one induces another to do a legal injury to a third with the intent
to benefit himself or to injure such third person, the act of
inducement is without cause and malicious. It must also be
conceded from the authorities cited that if the material men
from whom Parker Bros. purchased the necessities of trade,
for no reason at all but to injure Parker Bros., combined and
refused to sell them anything and drove them out of business, Parker Bros. would have had a cause of action against
such material men."
While there are a few authorities opposed to those just
quoted, as for example the case of Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis,
Minnesota Supreme Court (I893), cited at the beginning of
this article, yet these are sufficient to show that the weight
of judicial opinion in this country is in favor of the views
expressed by the dissenting opinion of Lord Halsbury in
!Allen v. Flood. Wherever these views obtain, it would in
all probability be held that a man, who persuades another
not to trade with a third person, for the purpose thereby of
coercing the third person into paying him a debt alleged to
be due him, becomes liable to such third person in an action
of tort on the ground of malice in the procurement of the
act which caused the injury. As we have seen in the case of
Bowen v. Hall (supra), an act causing injury is in the sense
of the law malicious when it is without justification or excuse, and it will hardly be contended that a creditor is justified in inflicting the injury, which must result from a boy147
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cott, because of the existence of a debt due from the person
thus injured. The creditor has the ordinary means of enforcing the collection of a claim through resort to the courts,
and any injury which the debtor may suffer through this
lawful method cannot be the ground of complaint. Where
the creditor, however, pursues the extraordinary plan of
boycott for the collection of his claim, he is, according to the
principles stated by Lord Halsbury in the case of Allen v.
Flood, inflicting a legal injury by interfering with the debtor's rights to make contracts necessary to the prosecution of
his trade or business, and the procurement of the boycott
being for the purpose of inflicting this legal injury, is a
malicious act; because without legal justification, and is
therefore actionable.
On the other hand, where the principle established by the
court in Allen v. Flood prevails, namely, that malice in the
procurement of an act, which is lawful in itself, will not constitute a ground of action as against the person procuring
it to be done, however great the injury inflicted, it would
necessarily be held that as a merchant may legally refuse to
deal with another on any ground whatever, the act of persuading him to exercise this privilege, however inalicious, is
not actionable.
Having reference to the modem conditions of trade, there
would seem little justification for drawing a distinction, on
the ground of lawfulness or unlawfulness, between an act
which brought about the breach of an existing contract to
the detriment of one-of the parties thereto, and an act which
deprives a man of the opportunity of making contracts necessary to the conduct of his trade and business.
A trader such as the plaintiff in the Pennsylvania case of
McIntyre v. Weinert (supra), being a retail produce dealer,
would find it absolutely necessary to the conduct of his business that he should be able from day to day to make contracts for supplies; and if his doing so is unjustifiably interfered with, the injury sustained is certainly as great as if
he were deprived of the benefit of contracts actually made.
Indeed, the injury as pointed out in the New York case of
Rice v. Manley (supra) is greater, because for the breach
of a contract he would have a right of action as against the
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other party thereto. That there is a legal right involved in
the freedom to enter into contracts of buying and selling is,
it is submitted, beyond question, and an injury, consisting
of the deprivation of this right, should logically be regarded
as he subject of legal redress.
In addition to the grounds of libel and malice, which have
been already discussed, the plaintiff in the Pennsylvania case
of McIntyre v. Weinert (supra), stated as an additional
ground of his action the fact that defendant had inflicted the
injury complained of through means of an unlawful combination. In the case of Allen v. Flood, Lord Watson, in
his opinion sustaining the judgment of the court, expressly
recognized that conspiracy affords in certain cases a special
ground for action to recover damages. In discussing the
case of Temperton v. Russell,15 he used the following language:
"I do not think it necessary to notice at length Temperton
v. Russell, in which substantially the same reasons were assigned by the Master of the Rolls and Lopes, L. J., as in the
present case. It is to my mind very doubtful whether in that
case there was any question before the court with regard
to the effect of the animus of the actor in making that unlawful which would otherwise have been lawful. The only findings of the jury which the court had to consider were: (I)
That the defendants had maliciously induced certain persons
to break their contracts with the plaintiffs, and (2) that the
defendants had maliciously conspired to induce, and had
thereby induced, certain persons not to make contracts with
the plaintiffs. There having been undisputed breaches of
contract by the persons found to have been induced, the first
of these findings raised the same question which had been
disposed of in Lumley v. Gye. According to the second
finding, the persons induced merely refused to make contracts, which was not a legal wrong on their part; but the
defendants who induced were found to have accomplished
their object, to the injury of the plaintiffs, by means of unlawful conspiracy-a clear ground of liability according to
Lumley v. Gye, if, as the court held, there was evidence to
prove it."
'L.

R. (1893)2

1 Q.

B. D. 715.
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Lord Davey also in his opinion in support of the judgment
called attention to the fact that the case was not one of conspiracy, thereby indicating that, if it were, the views of the
court as to the liability of the defendant might have been
different. That case can therefore not be cited as authority
for the proposition, as held in some quarters, that nothing
which is not actionable when done by one person can be
actionable or unlawful when done by a combination of persons.
In the very early case of Gregory v. Brunswick,16 the
Duke of Brunswick and others as defendants were held
liable in an action of damages on the ground of conspiracy
for combining to hiss the plaintiff, who was an actor, and
actually carrying out this purpose, though it was expressly
admitted by the court that it was perfectly lawful for anyone,
without preconcert, to express his disapproval of an actor in
this manner.
In Pennsylvania, conspiracy has always been regarded as
furnishing a special ground for an action of tort. Thus in
the case of Wildee v. McKee17, Justice Sterrett said:
"It cannot be doubted that trespass on the case for conspiracy to defame and thereby injure another in his particular avocation or business may be maintained whenever,
in pursuance of such unlawful combination, means have been
employed which tended to effectuate and, to a greater or less
extent, accomplish the object of the conspirators: Mott v.
Danforth, 6 Watts, 304-6; Haldeman v. Martin, io Barr.
369; Hood v. Palm, 8 Id. 237-9. In the last case it is said:
'A conspiracy to defame by spoken words, not actionable,
would be a subject of prosecution by indictment; and if so,
then equallyso a subject of prosecution byaction, by reason of
the presumption that injury and damage would be produced
by the combination of numbers. Defamation by the outcry
of numbers is as resistless as defamation by the written act of
an individual. The mode of publication is different; and it is
for this reason that an action lies, at the suit of one who has
been the subject of a conspiracy, whenever an indictment
"66 Man. and
2T

in

Pa. 335.

G.

205.
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would lie for it.' As an illustration of the principle, it is
said an indictment lies for a conspiracy to vex or annoy another, for instance, to hiss a play or an actor, right or wrong;
and hence, if the subject of such a conspiracy has been damnified thereby, a civil action may be maintained."
In Cote v. Murphy,18 in discussing the right of action of
the plaintiff for the refusal on the part of certain dealers to
furnish him materials, the court, through Justice Dean, said:
"We assume, so far as concerns defendants, if their agreement was unlawful, or if lawful it is carried out by unlawful
acts to the damage of plaintiff, the judgment should stand.
The authorities of this state go to show that while the act
of an individual may not be unlawful, yet the same act when
committed by a combination of two or more may be unlawful
and thereby be actionable."
The exact opposite of this doctrine was stated by Justice
Mitchell in the case of Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis (supra),
who said:
"What one man may lawfully do singly two or more may
lawfully agree to do jointly. The number-who unite to do
the act cannot change its character from lawful to unlawful.The gist of a private action for the wrongful act of many
is not the combination or conspiracy, but the damage done
or threatened to the plaintiff by the acts of the defendants.
If the act be lawful, the combination of many to commit
it may aggravate the injury, but cannot change the character of the act."
Of course, there are certain conspiracies, such as combinations in restraint of trade, which are not enforceable as between the parties themselves, and which may be the subject
of indictment because of the injury to the public, but which
do not form the ground of an action at the instance of an
individual. The authorities, however, would seem to make
a distinction between conspiracies, which affect an individual
simply as one member of a community generally affected by
it, and a conspiracy which is directed in a given case toward
a particular individual with the design of inflicting injury
upon him in his person, reputation or business. In the case
Mx59 Pa.

42o.

DEBTS

DUE MEMBERS

BY MEANS

OF

BOYCOTT.

of a number of merchants, for example, who by combination advance the price of an article of food, they may be subjected to an indictment, but would not be amenable to a civil
action at the hands of some person who was obliged by
reason of the combination to pay more for the particular
article of food affected by it; but it is submitted the case
would be different if these merchants entered into an agreement not to sell, except at an extortionate price or not to sell
at all, their products to a certain individual to his detriment.
In such a case if the combination is in the sense of the law
unlawful, it is quite clear that the particular individual injured should be able to obtain redress by an action of conspiracy against any one or all of the members of the combination.
What constitutes an unlawful combination, which will
give a right to civil action to persons injured by it, was discussed by Justice Dean in the case cited. He says:
"A dictum of Lord Denman in R. v. Seward, i A. & E.
71, gives this definition of a conspiracy: 'It is either a
combination to procure an unlawful object or to procure a
lawful object by unlawful means.' This leaves still undetermined the meaning to be given the words lawful and unlawful in their connection in the antithesis. An agreement may
be unlawful in the sense that the law will not aid in its enforcement, or recognize it as binding upon those who have
made it, yet not unlawful in the sense that it will punish those
who are parties to it, either criminally or by a verdict in damages. Lord Denman is reported to have said afterwards in R.
v. Heck, 9 A. & E. 690, that his definition was not very correct. See note to sec. 2291, Wharton's Criminal Law.
"It is conceded, however, in the case in hand, any one of
defendants, acting for himself, had a right to refuse to sell
to those favoring the eight hour a day, and so, acting for
himself, had the right to dissuade others from selling. If
the act were unlawful at all, it was because of the combination of a number. Gibson, J., in Com. v. Carlisle,Brightly's
R. 39, says: 'Where the act is lawful for the individual, it
can be the subject of conspiracy when done in concert, only
where there is a direct intention that injury shall result from
it, or where the object is to benefit the conspirators to the
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prejudice of the public or the oppression of individuals, and
where such prejudice or oppression is the natural and necessary consequence.'"
Upon the principles here set out is not an agreement
among a number to refuse to sell supplies to a debtor of one
of them the object of coercing him into paying the debt a
conspiracy, which gives the debtor a right of action if he
suffers damages from it? Such an agreement unquestionably establishes an artificial restraint upon the freedom of
trade, and is a direct infringement upon the rights of a
trader to obtain his supplies from such persons as would
ordinarily, if not restrained, be willing to sell to him. No
merchant would, under ordinary conditions, refuse to sell to
another if paid in cash the full price demanded for the article
sought to be purchased; and when he refuses to do this in a
given case by reason of being party to an agreement, it is
perfectly apparent that an artificial barrier to trade has been
set up between him and the person offering to purchase, to
the detriment of.the latter.
Debt-collecting agreements of the kind under discussion,
whether evidenced by the by-laws of an association or otherwise, usually make it obligatory upon the creditor in the
first instance to notify the other members that the
debt has not been paid and then make it incumbent upon
all the members to refuse to sell to the delinquent debtor.
Thus the latter, though he be an honest debtor, unable to
pay, but willing to do so, if given time, is deprived of any
opportunity to seek indulgence at the hands of his creditor,
and also of the means of continuing in business and securing thereby the means to discharge the debt. Thus not only
does such an agreement deprive the debtor affected by it of
his right to freely enter into contracts, as he would be able
to do, under normal conditions, but totally interferes with
the relations which would ordinarily exist between debtor
and creditor.
Again, the agreement has a necessary tendency, when set
in operation against a debtor who disputes the claim, to deprive him of his legal right to have the claim adjudicated in
the courts by due process of law. If the members of the
combination have been able to establish a monopoly in the
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supplies which the debtor may need, it is perfectly apparent
that he may find it rather to his advantage to pay even an
unjust claim than to be deprived of the means of continuing
his business. The Massachusetts case of Weston v. Barnicoat (supra) called attention to this phase of illegality, when
it suggested that the organization in that case might have
been found to be a "mere scheme to oust the courts of their
jurisdiction and to enforce colorable claims of the members
by a boycott, intended to take the place of legal process."
A combination fraught with such consequences to persons
injuriously affected by it is necessarily vexatious, harmful
and bad on grounds of public policy, and should therefore be
regarded as a conspiracy, which would constitute the basis
of an action of damages brought against any or all of the
members by a debtor whom it has injuriously affected in his
trade and business.
This conclusion is strongly sustained by the case of Hartnett v. Plumbers' Supply Ass'n,19 wherein proceedings in
the nature of quo warranto were instituted to forfeit the
charter of an Association organized for the purpose of "promoting pleasant relations amongst its members, discussing,
arbitrating and settling all matters pertaining to the prosperity and promotion of the jobbing plumbers' supply business, and establishing and maintaining a place for social
meetings," on the ground that the Association was exceeding
its charter privileges by collecting the debts due members
upon the boycott plan. The court decreed a franchise of
the charter. In the course of his opinion Justice Barker
said:
"In short, these proceedings against the alleged debtors
of its members, instituted by the corporation under the pretended sanction of its corporate franchises, are a method of
supplanting the courts by the private machinery of the corporation, of compelling such persons to pay what its members demand by means of threatening to expose to certain
dealers their alleged delinquencies by actually informing
such dealers that the persons owe overdue accounts, and by
preventing such persons from obtaining credit from a numsI69 Mass. 229 (1891).
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ber of dealers in goods needed in the business which such
persons are carrying on.
"This private corporation assumes, in the exercise of what
it claims to be the corporate privileges conferred by its
charter, to require other persons to submit their controversies to arbitration, dictates the terms upon which trade shall
be carried on by other persons, and requires other persons,
under penalties, practically severe, to submit to it their
reasons for their conduct in matters with which it has no
concern."
In deciding that petitioner, who was a debtor affected by
the boycott, had suffered legal injury, which under the quo
warranto statutes of Massachusetts entitled him to institute
the proceedings, the court said:
"The credit of a tradesman is an important and often his
most considerable resource, and he has a right to rely upon
and to use it in endeavoring to do business. No one has the
right to attempt to destroy or to injure his credit unless the
person so attempting can show that his own legitimate interests require such action. Assuming that the legitimate interests of sellers of plumbers' supplies may justify such persons in informing each other that a customer of one of them
has not paid for purchases, and in agreeing with each other
to sell him no goods except for cash paid before delivery,
the respondent has no justification for its interference with
the petitioner's business. The respondent is a legal person
other than and distinct from its members. It is not a seller
of plumbers' supplies, and has no interest in that market
and no legitimate concern with the question of who shall
purchase in that market upon credit. When without being
engaged in the trade or in any relation by which its legitimate interests are affected by the question whether the petitioner shall have credit in that market, the respondent assumes to notify sellers of such goods that the petitioner has
not paid his accounts, and to debar a considerable number
of dealers from selling to him upon credit, his right to an
open market and to proffer his credit without offici6us interference from persons who have no legitimate interest in the
question whether he shall buy upon credit, is injured and put
in hazard."
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This opinion has been quoted at length because it bears
upon the second branch of the question proposed, namely:
whether a debtor injured by a boycott has any right of redress as against the Association through which it was instituted. In this case it was held that refusal to extend credit
at the instance of the Association was a legal wrong, for
which the wronged person was entitled to redress, because
the Association had no legitimate interest to serve in the
matter.
If this case should be followed it is quite clear that charters
of the various trade associations organized for the purpose
of collecting debts of members upon the plan indicated
should be forfeited, for in all instances it will probably be
found that their charters do not expressly authorize the
carrying out of such a purpose any more than did the charter
considered in the Massachusetts case.
In view of the many objections to the boycott plan of collecting debts, it will in all likelihood never be approved as
legitimate by the courts. The origin of the term boycott
itself is surrounded by circumstances of illegality and oppression, as will appear from the language of Mr. Justin
McCarthy's work, "England Under Gladstone," which may
appropriately conclude this article:
"The strike was supported by a form of action, or rather
inaction, which soon became historical. Captain Boycott
was an Englishman, an agent of Lord Earne, and a farmer
of Lough Mask, in the wild and beautiful district of Connemara. In his capacity as agent he had served notices upon
Lord Earne's tehants, and the tenants suddenly retaliated in
the most unexpected way by, in the language of schools and
society, sending Captain Boycott to Coventry in a very thorough manner. The population of the region for miles around
resolved not to have anything to do with him, and, as far as
they could prevent it, not to allow any one else to have anything to do with him. His life appeared to be in danger;
he had to claim police protection. His servants fled from
his as servants flee from their masters in some plaguestricken Italian city. The awful sentence of excommunication could hardly have rendered him more helplessly alone
for a time; no one would work for him; no one would supply
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him with food. He and his wife had to work in their own
fields themselves, in most unpleasant imitation of the
Theocritian shepherds and shepherdesses, and play out their
grim eclogue in their deserted fields, with the shadows of
armed constabulary ever at their heels. The Orangemen of
the north heard of Captain Boycott and his sufferings, and
the way in which he was holding his ground, and they organized assistance and sent him down armed laborers from
Ulster. To prevent civil war, the authorities had to send
a force of soldiers and police to Lough Mask, and Captain
Boycott's harvests were brought in, and his potatoes dug,
by the armed Ulster laborers, guarded always by the little
army."
FrancisB. Bracken.

